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Union representation limits management's discretion to set the wages of covered workers. 
Management is required to bargain with the workers' union. The effect of this process on 
the wages of union workers is clear: unions raise the wages of their members. Moreover, 
union wage setting is more egalitarian, equalizing wages within establishments (Freeman 
1982) and across establishments (Slichter, Healy and Livernash 1960). "Single rate" and 
related policies have long been associated with unionism in the U.S. and abroad, inter alia 
out of a concern for equity (Burda 1995), worker solidarity and organizational unity. In 
this paper we look elsewhere for "union wage effects." Specifically we ask whether unions 
also impact the pay of non-union workers in the firm, specifically a firm's managers and 
executives. 
According to rules of the National Labor Relations Board, managers cannot form unions 
themselves. Nevertheless, there are several mechanisms by which the unions of workers 
in an establishment might affect the pay of managers. At bargaining time and more 
visibly during periods of industrial disputes, workers often voice concern over the pay and 
compensation of executives. Anecdotal evidence suggests that when workers are organized, 
executives or directors feel more pressure to limit the pay of top managers. DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1991), for example, find that corporate executives and other white collar workers 
accepted major pay cuts in years where steel firms sought to obtain pay concessions from 
blue collar workers in union negotiations. To the best of our knowledge, however, the link 
between unionization and executive pay has not been previously formally investigated. 
Our work is related to three different literatures. First, our paper is linked to the 
literature on the impact of unions on economic outcomes. While a tremendous amount of 
evidence exists that unions raise wages and benefits for their members, the effect of unions 
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on the wages of non-union workers in the same or competing firms is less clear (Freeman 
and Medoff 1984, Neumark and Wachter 1995, Rosen 1969).1 Abowd (1989) finds, for 
instance, that collective bargains are "efficient" (in the sense of maximizing the sum of 
shareholders' and union members' wealth). Given the evidence that profits are lower in 
unionized firms (Ruback and Zimmerman 1984) this suggests that unions may redistribute 
rents from the owners of firms to the workers. If this is the case, it would be interesting 
to know whether other constituents in the firm gain or lose from the presence of unions. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) briefly discuss the impact of unions on white collar workers 
within the same firm (who seem to gain from unionization), but they do not discuss the 
most highly paid workers: managers and top executives. 
Second, our work contributes to the growing literature on CEO compensation. The 
compensation of top executives varies widely across firms. Although the focus of much of 
the literature has been on the role of firm performance in CEO compensation (Jensen and 
Murphy 1990), it appears to account for little of the variation in the level of CEO pay 
across firms (abstracting from variability introduced by revaluations of stock and option 
grants as stressed by Hall and Liebman (1997)). A related literature has attempted to 
explain cross-sectional differences in CEO pay. Joskow, Rose and Shepard (1993), for 
example, ask whether political pressures may limit the level of CEO pay. They find that 
CEO compensation is lower in regulated industries and that pay is less sensitive to firm 
performance in these industries. Joskow, Rose and Wolfram (1994) link CEO pay in 
the electric utility industry even more directly to specific regulatory practices. Akin to 
regulation, which gives a particular stakeholder group (customers) more voice, unions may-
be able to affect the pay of CEOs for their own benefit. 
Third, there is a link between our investigation and the recent literature on changes in 
indeed, Pencavel (1994) notes that "while there may be a good deal of evidence of a qualitative kind 
to support the notion that the presence of trade unions affects the wages paid to nonunion workers, good, 
solid evidence on the direction, size, and variations of these effects does not exist." 
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wage inequality. Freeman (1993), Card (1992). and DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) 
have found that the decline in unionization can explain roughly 30 percent of the recent 
increase in wage inequality in the U.S., while Bell and Pitt (1995) put this number at about 
25 percent for the U.K. Moreover, DiNardo and Lemieux (1997) and Freeman (1996) also 
find an association between unionization and the differences and changes in wage inequality 
across countries. These studies, however, focus only on the unions' wage impacts on covered 
workers. Since unionized workers typically occupy the lower and middle part of the wage 
distribution, these papers do not attempt to account for changes in wage inequality that 
have taken place among non-unionized workers in the top of the wage distribution. If the 
presence of unions has an impact on the pay of the highly paid as well, however, the decline 
of unionization in countries like the U.S. and the U.K. might explain an even bigger part 
of the spreading wage distributions. 
Data on unionization and managerial pay are not readily available. We have therefore 
collected data from a variety of sources and we perform a number of different comparisons 
in our investigation. We start in section 2 by investigating cross-national data on union-
ization and CEO pay, which differs substantially across countries. Abowd and Bognanno 
(1995) have assembled information on CEO compensation for 12 countries, which we use 
in conjunction with unionization rates obtained for these countries. 
In section 3, we use several sources of data on the compensation of CEOs (originally 
collected by Kevin Murphy) and unionization of firms. Since the pay of the top five 
executives of publicly held companies has to be disclosed annually, we focus on CEO 
compensation in this paper as does most of the literature on executive pay. Hirsch (1991) 
and Bronars, Deere and Tracy (1994) have assembled data on the unionization of particular 
firms. We use their data together with the pay data for CEOs to investigate the link 
between unionization and executive pay. 
In reporting correlations between unionization and managerial pay, we are not neces-
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sarily able to establish whether unions actually cause differences in compensation for the 
groups we study. For example, it might merely be the case that unions are to be found in 
industries or firms which have higher rents. If these rents are shared among various groups, 
including workers and managers, we would find a positive correlation between unionization 
and managerial pay. We try a variety of strategies to understand these issues, however each 
is imperfect. For example, we use control variables to capture the level of rents in different 
firms, but these may well be inadequate. W e also look at changes in unionization over 
time, but these changes themselves may have a particular correlation with changes in the 
well-being of firms. 
In another attempt to address the potential endogeneity of unionization we match our 
CEO data to data from the NLRB election files on union certification and decertification 
elections in section 4. This allows us to investigate the impact of changes in unionization 
on executive pay growth conditional on an election. These changes are arguably more 
likely to be random than the choice of establishments which are targetted for organization. 
The impact of representation elections on numerous outcomes has been analyzed in the 
literature (Ruback and Zimmerman 1984, Bronars and Deere 1993). Unfortunately, our 
election sample is small, and other explanations are also consistent with the results. 
The analyses discussed above only refer to top executives. In section 5, we use a panel of 
grouped data by region and industry, which we constructed from the 1983 to 1993 Current 
Population Surveys to gain some idea about the impact of unions on the pay of managers 
other than CEOs. Related results using a similar strategy are also reported by Neumark 
and Wachter (1995). 
None of these data sources are ideal so we would like to interpret our results with 
caution. Together, however, the various data and approaches provide an interesting and 
informative portrait of the association of managerial pay and unionization. To preview our 
findings, we generally find that unions are associated with lower CEO pay in cross-sectional 
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regressions. Changes in managerial pay, on the other hand, bear less of a relationship with 
changes in unionization rates, and sometimes we find a positive relationship in changes. 
Finally, there is consistent evidence that where unions are stronger fewer managers are 
employed. 
2 International Comparisons 
Many observers have noted that American CEOs tend to be paid much more than CEOs in 
other countries, whether in terms of direct comparisons or relative to other workers in the 
economy (see for example Crystal (1992), and Bok (1993)). Abowd and Bognanno (1995) 
have assembled comparable data on CEO pay from a variety of compensation consulting 
firms for 12 OECD countries for the most comprehensive international comparison. They 
document clearly that CEO pay is highest in the U.S. In addition, they try to explain 
international compensation patterns with the structure of taxation. While they find no 
impact of corporate taxes, personal marginal tax rates seem to have a large impact on the 
level of CEO compensation. Nevertheless, a significant U.S. residual remains unexplained. 
If it is true that unions lower executive compensation, then the relatively low U.S. 
unionization rate may help explain the higher levels of pay. In order to assess this possi-
bility, we have obtained the compensation data used by Abowd and Bognanno (1995). We 
will briefly describe the main features of the dataset, the details of which are documented 
in the appendix to their paper. The data are for the years 1984 and 1988 to 1992, and 
cover the countries Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. They are based on reports by various 
compensation consulting firms; and in some instances data from more than one source are 
available for a single year. Abowd and Bognanno collected data <"or a variety of high level 
managers. Like them, we report results for CEOs and top human resource managers only. 
These are the groups for whom the largest samples are available. 
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The compensation amounts refer to total compensation, including cash compensation. 
benefits and perquisites, and long term compensation in the form of stock or option grants. 
Abowd and Bognanno refer to this as the total compensation cost, the amount a firm has 
to spend on an executive. An important question is how to make these costs comparable 
across countries. We use three ap^.oaches. The first is a real measure of compensation 
at actual exchange rates by converting compensation into U.S. dollars for each year and 
deflating by the U.S. consumer price index. Comparisons using the real measure will reflect 
the strong depreciation of the dollar over the sample period. This is avoided by using 
OECD purchasing power parity exchange rates and the OECD index of consumer prices. 
However, there is necessarily a degree of arbitrariness in P P P exchange rates. The third 
method is to look at executives relative to a comparison group within the same country. 
We compare executives to non-supervisory manufacturing workers. This comparison is of 
course affected by the impact of unions on the pay of manufacturing workers and by trends 
in their compensation. Nevertheless, in practice we obtain relatively similar results with all 
three methods. The data on unionization are obtained from the Trade Union Membership 
Database by Visser (1997). 
Tables I to III contain our regression results for the various compensation measures. For 
each measure, we start by presenting results including the country's unionization rate, time 
dummies, and dummies for source of the compensation data. Unionization is associated 
with 50 log points lower CEO pay in the first column of Table I. Column (2) includes a 
dummy variable for the U.S. and a U.S. specific time trend. It reveals that about half of 
the previous union effect is due to the presence of the U.S. in the dataset. In the next 
column, we run a specification similar to Abowd and Bognanno (1995). These regressions 
include a time trend (instead of time dummies), a U.S. dummy, a U.S. trend, the marginal 
employee tax rate including both income and payroll taxes, the marginal corporate tax 
rate, and dummy variables for the data source. Unlike Abowd and Bognanno, we do not 
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control for the average size of a company in our regressions, so that our exact results differ 
slightly from theirs. Changing the specification in this way does relatively little to the 
union coefficient although the marginal employee tax rate and the unionization rates have 
a correlation of about 0.5 in this sample. The fourth column presents results controlling 
L / country fixed effects. Unfortunately, there is not enough within country variation in 
unionization to estimate the effect of unions anymore. 
The right hand panel of each of the Tables I to III presents results using the PPP 
measure instead of the real measure of compensation. The effects on the unionization rate 
become stronger in the cross-sectional regressions now, but the basic picture is unchanged. 
In Table II, which presents analogous regressions for top HR managers we also find similar 
results. The union coefficient in the HR manager regressions is small and insignificant using 
the real compensation measure, except when the marginal tax rate variables are included. 
However, the coefficient on the employee tax rate is positive rather than negative in this 
case. The results are much more similar to the CEO results for the P P P measure. The 
PPP measure is probably a more sensible measure of cross country differences in pay over 
this period of large exchange rate fluctuations. 
Table III contains results for compensation relative to a manufacturing operative. These 
results are little different than those using the PPP measure. While unionization rates are 
associated with a large negative effect on the executive/worker pay gap across countries, 
this effect becomes rather unstable once we control for country effects. 
Overall, we find a large negative association between unionization rates and executive 
pay in a cross section of countries. Going from no unionization to 100 percent unioniza-
tion typically implies about 40 to 80 percent lower compensation for CEOs and top HR 
managers. H >wever, these effects are due to between country differences and are not mir-
rored by a similar association between pay growth and changes in unionization rates within 
countries. 
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One question in assessing these results is whether union membership rates are the right 
variables in this exercise. What matters for the wages of most workers in many countries 
are coverage rates, not membership. France, for example, had a unionization rate of around 
15 percent in the mid-1980s, but 90 percent of the workforce where covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. Freeman (1996) finds that coverage rates across countries are more 
strongly associated with wage inequality than unionization rates. 
Nevertheless, we think there is a good case to be made that it is union membership we 
should be interested in here. One channel we are interested in is the role unions play in 
putting a lid on executive compensation. Obviously, CEOs are not subject to collective 
bargaining agreements or mandatory extensions. Instead, we believe that such a link would 
work through more informal political pressures. It is likely that this pressure is larger if 
more workers care about pay equity, something they voice by being organized in unions. 
Another reason for preferring membership rates is more pragmatic: these are available 
more widely. The OECD (1997) has published data for union coverage for the years 
1980, 1990, and 1994 for the countries in our sample. Using these, and interpolating 
the intervening years, we generally found similar correlations (not reported in the tables) 
with executive pay to those shown for the membership data. However, the coefficients for 
coverage rates tend to be somewhat closer to zero than those for membership rates. This 
lends support to our conjecture that membership might be the more sensible measure in 
this context. 
3 The Unionization of U.S. Firms and CEO Pay 
Data on unionization rates of individual firms are not readily available. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to gather these data through a variety of channels. Bronars et al. (1994) con-
structed unionization measures for a sample of large U.S. firms from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Bargaining Calendar. The Bargaining Calendar contains information on the 
8 
workers covered by collective bargaining agreements in particular establishments. By di-
viding this information on the number of covered workers by employment from Compustat. 
the authors were able to construct coverage rates for individual firms. One shortcoming 
of this exercise is that the sample is limited to firms which had any collective bargaining 
agreements, i.e. a unionization rate greater than zero. This is simply because matching 
the universe of contracts to the universe of firms is virtually impossible. The sample is 
also limited to firms with contracts covering at least 1000 workers. Because the union em-
ployment data have to be interpolated between contract dates, Bronars, Deere, and Tracy 
constructed four year averages of their unionization measures to lessen the impact of this 
smoothing. Their data cover the periods 1971-1974, 1975-1978, and 1979-1982. 
A different approach was pursued by Hirsch (1991) who conducted a survey of large U.S. 
employers in manufacturing about their unionization rates in 1987. The survey contained 
questions on the current unionization level and retrospective questions about unionization 
in 1977. The Hirsch data refer to the firm's entire workforce in the U.S. and Canada. 
We obtained both the Bronars, Deere, and Tracy data and the Hirsch data for 1977. 
We merged both datasets with information about the firms from Compustat and with CEO 
pay data which are published annually in Forbes magazine. We obtained the latter data 
for the relevant sample years from Kevin Murphy. 
In Table IV we run OLS regressions of CEO pay on the Bronars, Deere, and Tracy 
measure of unionization and a variety of other covariates. Our measure of CEO pay is the 
logarithm of salary, bonuses, and the value of other compensation but excluding the value of 
stock or option grants. The latter part of compensation is potentially large for many CEOs 
but the Securities and Exchange Commission has only recently required firms to uniformly 
disclose options in a given year. Forbes does report the value of exercised options in a 
given year which some authors add to salary, bonus, and other compensation to arrive 
at total compensation. However, this is not really a good measure of total compensation 
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because the value of options should be included in compensation when they are received. 
not when they are exercised. If we additionally include the value of exercised options in 
compensation in this section we get very similar results (which are not reported in the 
tables). 
Column (1) includes regressors which are typically found in cross-sectional regressions 
for the level of CEO compensation: the years of age and tenure of the CEO and the square 
of these variables, the logarithm of sales and employment to control for firm size effects, 
and the percent change in the value of the firm (return) during the four year period and 
its lag. Except for the percent change in the value of the firm (return), these regressors 
are constructed as the average over the four year period (before taking logs or squares). 
Since CEOs may turn over during any four year interval we also control for whether the 
CEO changes during the period. Finally, we control for period effects to capture aggregate 
growth in CEO pay, and the impact of changing market returns for these firms, etc. 
Our key regressor is the fraction of employees covered by union contracts in the firm. 
We find that CEO pay is lower by about 3 percent for a 10 percentage point increase in 
unionization. In order to probe whether this relationship is indeed roughly linear in the 
data we also broke the unionization rates into five categories for 0 to 20 percent unionized, 
21 to 40 percent, etc. Dummy variable results are shown in the second column of coefficients 
in Table IV and they reveal indeed a roughly linear relationship. The only category which 
does not follow this pattern is firms with more than 80 percent union workers. In those 
firms CEO pay is as high as in firms where only half the workforce is covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. However, this cell is very small, so that we do not want to put too 
much weight on this result. 
Hirsch (1991), Bronars et al. (1994), and others have found that unionized firms have 
lower investment, more capital, lower growth rates, and lower profits. Since such firms 
may be deemed as less successful by the directors or shareholders, CEO pay could suffer 
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indirectly from the consequences unions have on the firm. In addition, unions are more 
likely to organize firms with higher capital-labor ratios or with higher rents. The results 
discussed above reflect both direct effects of unions on CEO pay as well as indirect effects 
working throught the effect of unions on investment, growth, and profits, or selective 
organization of higher rent plants. In order to estimate only the direct association of 
unions and CEO pay we include a number of additional variables which we constructed 
from Compustat data: sales growth and employment growth from the previous four year 
period, the log of property, plant, and equipment per worker, a crude measure of Tobin's Q 
(total assets divided by the sum of the book value of debt plus the market value of equity), 
and the ratio of investment in property, plant, and equipment to sales. Including these 
regressors lowers the value of the unionization coefficient by about 40 percent. However, 
CEO pay is still lower by almost 2 percent for a 10 percentage point change in unionization. 
For comparability with the Hirsch data we also ran these regressions separately for 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Results are displayed in Table V. The 
relationship between CEO pay and unionization is weaker within sectors, a 10 percentage 
point increase in unionization means only about 1 percent lower executive pay. In addition, 
the relationship is no longer significant. In Table VI we go one step further and exploit the 
panel nature of the dataset. By including 44 two digit industry effects in the regression 
we again find an insignificant effect of -0.1 but this effect goes to zero once 103 three digit 
industry effects are included. Thus, the association between unionization and CEO pay 
seems to reflect mostly industry differences. A curious result appears when we control for 
firm effects: in this case we find a positive and significant association between unionization 
rates and CEO pay. A 10 percentage point increase in unionization means 2.6 percent 
higher executive pay.2 
Table VII presents our results using the Hirsch data. The regressions are specified anal-
2The positive effect is entirely due to the changes from the 1975-1978 to the 1979-1982 period. However, 
we have not been able to discern what is different during that period from before. 
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ogously to the previous tables but the sample is a simple cross section. For comparability 
across data sets, and because there is large variability in CEO pay from year to year, we 
used the same four year aggregates of the variables for these regressions as well. Thus, 
all variables refer to the period 1975-1978, except for the unionization measure, which is 
supposed to represent unionization in 1977. However, recall that this is a retrospective 
survey measure, so that the respondent may well have reported something closer to an 
average for the years roughly ten years ago. When we run these regressions with data only 
for 1977 we find basically the same results. 
A 10 percentage point increase in the unionization rate in the Hirsch data is associated 
with 1.5 percent lower executive pay. The effect is slightly larger when we limit the sample 
to firms with some unionization, the sample which is most comparable with the Bronars, 
Deere, and Tracy data. In fact, these coefficients are of the same magnitude as what we 
found in the Bronars, Deere, and Tracy data for manufacturing only. The effects are not 
very precisely estimated because this dataset is rather small. 
A curious result in this dataset is that CEOs in firms with positive unionization rates up 
to about 60 percent actually get paid more than CEOs in firms without unions. However, 
firms where more than 60 percent of the workers are unionized have lower paid CEOs than 
any of the other groups. It is essentially this difference which shows up in the regressions 
with just a linear unionization rate. We are unable to discern whether this is actually a 
meaningful result or whether it is just due to the small sample size. Remember that the 
Bronars, Deere, and Tracy sample only contained firms with some unionized workers, so 
that we cannot do an analogous comparison of firms with and without unions. 
Including covariates like growth rates and measures which capture rents does not change 
the union coefficient much in the Hirsch dataset. As before, including industry effects 
attenuates the union effect but the attenuation is also not as strong as in the Bronars, 
Deere, and Tracy data. Regressions including two and three digit industry dummies are 
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displayed in Table VIII. In neither case is the coefficient on fraction unionized significantly 
different from zero. We obviously cannot include firm effects as in Table VI since this is a 
simple cross section. 
One issue in all of these regressions is that the measures of unionization are rather 
imperfect, so that our coefficients are likely to be biased because of measurement error. 
Because the Hirsch measure and the Bronars, Deere, and Tracy data are constructed 
independently, it seems sensible to assume that the errors in these measures might be 
independent. Bronars, Deere, and Tracy analyze the correlation between the two measures 
with a subsample of the data with the same firms. Under the assumption of classical 
measurement error, they conclude that the relevant attenuation factors for both their 
data and the Hirsch data is about 0.55. Furthermore, the same applies when they isolate 
within industry variation in the data. This means that the coefficients should be roughly 
multiplied by 2 to eliminate the attenuation bias from measurement error. We found 
roughly similar changes in the coefficients using IV estimates on the overlapping sample, 
indicating that these conclusions are unchanged partialling out the effects of our covariates. 
Attenuation due to measurement error is unlikely a good explanation of our findings 
when we control for industry or firm effects. Attenuation does not seem to be much greater 
within industries, while we find that the union coefficient is substantially closer to zero. 
We would expect that the signal to total variance ratio for the unionization rate declines 
more strongly in the within firm data, but this is extremely unlikely to lead to a positive 
coefficient with a t-statistic of 2.5. Thus, changes in unionization rates seem to have a very 
different relationship with CEO pay than the levels of unionization. 
4 Representation Elections and CEO Pay 
Since both the presence of unions and CEO pay may be determined by some variables 
like rents or other aspects of the well-being of the firm which are difficult to capture, 
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(12 percent) are decertification elections. All but 3 of the decertification elections are 
initiated by employees covered by the bargaining agreement. 70 of the elections in our 
sample (25 percent) are won by the union. This is much lower than the aggreagate union 
win rate during the sample period (about 45 percent). Unions tend to be less successful 
ir larger establishments like the ones in our sample. The success rate in our sample is 
not unrepresentative for establishments with more than 250 eligible voters. The union is 
more likely to win decertification elections (the win rate in the sample is 57 percent) than 
certification elections (where the win rate is only 20 percent). 
Our dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of salary, bonus and other com-
pensation of the CEO between the year after the election and year before the election. 
Since the matched sample spans a period from 1975 to 1991, CEO pay is deflated by the 
consumer price index. The key independent variables are dummies for whether the union 
gains or looses members. The dummy for a membership gain will be one if the union wins a 
certification election, and the dummy for a membership loss will be one if the union looses 
a decertification election. We also experimented with a measure capturing the change in 
the number of workers unionized but that measure turned out to be very imprecise. CEO 
tenure and age refer to the year before the election, all other variables are changes between 
the period after the election and the year before. 
Table IX presents regression results. The first column only includes the dummies for 
the change in union membership and a control for whether the CEO turned over either in 
the election year or the year after (which is used in calculating the change in CEO salary). 
Changes in unionization induced by elections seem to have little effect on CEO salaries. 
Unfortunately this effect is also estimated very imprecisely because there are only few 
elections which induce a change in union membership. Adding other covariates, like CEO 
tenure and age, stock returns and growth rates of the firm, and changes in the capital/labor 
ratio, Tobin's Q, or the investment rate does not change the estimates. This might indicate 
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this could easily lead to the observed correlations between unionization and CEO pay. 
Even in changes, it is unlikely that the factors which move CEO pay and unionization 
are unrelated. Thus, it would be interesting to look at changes in unionization which are 
more likely to be random. Therefore, we analyze the changes in union membership induced 
by the outcomes of union representation elections conditional on the fact that an election 
took place. The election outcome will be random if the lobbying effects of unions and 
management are not themselves dependent on the same factors which lead a union or firm 
to seek an election in the first place. Bronars and Deere (1993) report that union wins and 
losses are uncorrelated with previous changes in sales, employment, or investment at the 
firm. Bronfenbrenner (1997), on the other hand, shows that higher company profitability is 
systematically associated with lower union win rates for a sample of certification elections 
in the late 1980s. However, she also concludes that there seems to be a large idiosyncratic 
component to election outcomes. Thus, election outcomes are probably not quite perfect 
for our purpose, but might give valuable additional insights into the effect of unions on 
CEO pay. 
We constructed a sample of 284 elections in large U.S. firms, using the NLRB election 
files from 1977 to 1992, which we can match to Compustat and to CEO pay data. The 
data contain both certification elections and decertification elections (either initiated by 
workers or by management). First, we selected elections with 250 or more eligible voters 
from the election files. For these elections, we tried to match the company names, which 
appear on the election files, to the names as they appear in Compustat. In this process, we 
made sure to capture subsidiaries of larger conglomerates. This resulted in 1,191 matches. 
However, we can only match 487 of these to both the Compustat and the CEO pay data for 
the relevant years. Excluding those elections with missing values on some of the covariates 
we use, we are left with 284 observations. 
Of the 284 sample cases, 249 elections (88 percent) are certification elections and 35 
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that the elections provide a better experiment than the cross section regressions in affecting 
the union status of workers in a fashion unrelated to changes in firm characterisitics. 
In Table X we reran these regressions on the subsample of elections which are not 
associated with the turnover of the CEO. Other conditions might have changed at the 
firm as the CEO turns over, and changes in pay may be less meaningful when they are 
observed for different individuals. Table X shows that there is a larger effect of successful 
decertification elections on the pay of incumbent CEOs. Winning such an election boosts 
CEO pay by around 10 to 15 percent. This result could indicate that CEOs get rewarded 
when they manage to end the representation of a union for a bargaining union. This effect 
is still not significant in the small sample at hand. 
5 Unionization and the Pay of Other Managers 
CEOs, no doubt, are a very special group of employees. Therefore, it seems useful to 
also have an assessment of the influence of unions on other executives and managers. 
Unfortunately, no comparable data for other managers are available as there are for CEOs. 
This makes a firm level analysis of this question impossible. Instead, we follow the strategy 
of Neumark and Wachter (1995), and analyze the pay of managers at the level of industry 
and regional cells, which we construct from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Neumark 
and Wachter use industry level data from the CPS for the period 1973 to 1989 and find 
that a 10 point higher fraction of blue collar workers unionized in an industry is associated 
with 1.8 percent lower wages for managers and professionals. 
We use the 1983 to 1993 Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from the CPS to construct 
cells at the industry/region/year level. Our sample starts in 1983 because this is the first 
year where union status is available for the outgoing rotation groups. In order to have cells 
of sufficient size, we aggregated two digit industries into 26 broader industries, and states 
into 16 regions. A complete list of the industry and state cells used is given in the appendix. 
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While we are mostly interested in the effects of unions on managers, we also look at spillover 
effects from unionization on three other groups. To this end, we break occupations into 
five groups. The first is executives and managers (1980 3-digit SIC occupation codes 
3-22). These are primarily occupations who supervise others. In principle, workers in 
this group cannot form unions under NLRB rules. The second is management related 
occupations (occupation codes 23-37), which includes business specialists like accountants, 
analysts, inspectors, etc. In practice, the line between these two groups is probably not 
quite as clear. The third group is professionals (occupation codes 43-199), which includes 
a wide range of professions like engineers, scientists, physicians, nurses, and other health 
professions, teachers, librarians, social scientists, social workers, lawyers, artists, etc. This 
group may be unionized itself, but professionals tend to be highly educated and often 
resemble managers more than they resemble other workers. While we do not want to 
lump them together with the group of managers, they seem like an interesting group to 
study as well. We refer to all remaining occupations (codes 203-889) as workers. We split 
this group into union workers, those who are covered by collective bargaining themselves, 
and non-union workers. Our samples are restricted to those working five or more hours, 
who are in the private sector and not self-employed, and with valid wage and occupation 
information in the CPS. 
Table XI provides means of the characteristics of these five groups for the years 1983 
and 1993. Managers, management related occupations, and professionals have comparable 
wages but professionals tend to have more education. Managers and union workers tend 
to be older than the other groups. 
For each of these groups we report two measures of unionization. The fraction unionized 
in the occupation refers to the fraction of observations in this occupation who respond that 
they are covered by a union contract. Between 5 and 6 percent of managers and related 
occupations in 1983 report that they are covered by collective bargaining. This is surprising 
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since we do not expect managers to be organizeed in unions. This result may be due 
to measurement error because either the union or the occupation question are answered 
or coded incorrectly. However, 5 percent seems a little too high compared to typical 
misclassification rates (Card 1996) so that some of this may reflect actual unionization of 
this group. Some managers may be in relatively low level positions, who do not directly 
supervise others, and who are therefore not subject to NLRB rules. When we run standard 
cross-sectional wage regressions, we find that unionized managers have roughly 8 percent 
higher wages than other managers, about half the union wage differential typically found 
for all workers. This also seems to indicate that at least some of this reflects actual 
unionization of the group. Not surprisingly, unionization is higher among professionals 
since this is the broadest of our upper income categories, but not as high as among other 
workers. 
The penultimate row in each panel in Table XI reports the fraction of unionized workers 
(those who are neither managers, related, or professionals) in the industry/region cells to 
which a manager, professional, etc. belongs. If all occupations were equally distributed 
across these cells, this number would be constant across the different columns (except for 
sampling variation) and would reflect the unionization level of workers in the economy. 
But different occupations tend to be more concentrated in certain industries. For example, 
there are more managers in banking and other finance than there are in the construction 
industry. Since the unionization rates of workers in these industries differ, and since the 
reported means for managers, say, are weighted by the number of managers in a cell, the 
fraction of union workers reported for each occupation differs. Thus, the fraction of union 
workers refers to the exposure of the occupation to unionized workers in the particular cell. 
The most notable, but unsurprising result about this fraction is that union workers tend 
to be concentrated in industry/region cells which are more highly unionized. Exposure to 
unionized workers has declined for all occupations over time. 
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The final row in each panel reports the fraction of managers in the industry/region cell 
an occupation belongs to. This fraction does not differ much for different occupations. For 
each occupation there is about a 2 percentage point increase in the fraction of managers 
over the sample period. 
In order to assess the effect of unions on the pay of managers, we estimated a regression 
of the form 
In w'ijt = X?jtj3 + 7 ^ + HJ +vs + 6t + £'ijt. 
w*
 t is the wage of individual i in industry j and state s at time t. X"]t is a set of covariates 
which includes years of schooling, potential experience and its square, and dummies for 
female, black, whether the individual lives in an SMSA, and part-time status (less than 35 
hours a week). u°t is the fraction of workers who are unionized in each state/ industry/t ime 
cell. Notice that this variable does not vary at the individual level. In order to implement 
the estimation of this model and to obtain standard errors robust to a group structure in 
Sijt we first regressed \nw\lt on X°jt and a full set of industry/state/year interactions. In a 
second stage, we regressed the coefficients from these dummy variables on the fraction of 
workers unionized in the industry. The second stage regression is weighted by the number 
of observations in the cell. The results from the second stage regression are shown in Tables 
XII and XIII. 
Column (1) in Table XII displays results which control for separate industry, region, and 
year effects. The results indicate a positive association between unionization of workers 
and the wages of professionals, but not managers or related occupations. In addition, 
unionization in the industry and region is associated with higher pay for both covered and 
uncovered workers. The differential between the two groups is about 16 percent, roughly 
corresponding to the union wage differential. 
We know from the literature on industry wage differentials that unions tend to be more 
concentrated in high wage industries. Thus, if these industry wage differentials change over 
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time, and this affects trends in unionization, we may be more likely picking up changes in 
the industry wage structure than the effects of unions on other occupations. Therefore, 
we also control for the interaction of industry and year effects in column (2). The results 
are now much more uniform. Higher unionization is associated with higher pay for all 
occupations now, except professionals, and these results are mostly very significant. The 
pay of managers is about 0.8 percent higher for any 10 point change in worker unionization. 
For non-union workers the effect is lower at around 1.8 percent, still twice as big as the 
effect on managers. 
We also added a control for the fraction of the occupation covered by a union contract 
themselves because we were concerned that the results may simply reflect correlations in 
unionization rates in an industry across different groups. These results are displayed in 
column (3). They are hardly changed from the previous specification. 
One hypothesis why unions affect the pay of other groups including managers is that 
different groups of workers split the rents accruing to a firm. For a given amount of rents 
to go around, we would expect that managers and other white collar employees get fewer 
of the rents as workers get more. Thus, apart from the fraction of workers unionized 
it is also the size of the union wage premium which matters. Columns (4) through (6) 
display similar specifications with the union wage differential in the industry/state/year 
cell included as a separate covariate. We obtained this regressor by running a regression on 
the pooled micro data for union and non-union workers including the vector X^t and a full 
set of industry/state/year/union interactions. The union wage differential is then given 
by the difference between the union and non-union effect for a particular industry, state, 
and year. The results on the fraction of workers unionized are again hardly changed. The 
union wage differential has a negative effect on the wages of all occupations. The effect is 
close to zero for managers and strongest for non-union workers. 
Table XIII makes another at tempt to address the issue that the fraction of workers 
20 
unionized (or the union wage differential) could reflect the level of rents in an industry and 
state. One way to capture these rents may be to include the industry wage differential 
for non-union workers in the regression. This was again created from the same first stage 
regression which we ran to compute the cell level union wage differential. The industry 
wage differential has a large and strongly significant effect on the wages in each occupation. 
After controlling for industry*year interactions the elasticity of an occupation's wage with 
respect to the wage of non-union workers in the cell is about 0.45. At the same time, 
the impact of both the fraction of workers unionized and the union wage differential is 
diminished. For professionals the effect of the fraction of workers unionized now turns 
negative and the union wage differential positive. For management related occupations 
neither variable matters. For managers only the union wage differential seems to have a 
small positive effect. These results seem to indicate that the fraction of workers unionized 
in a cell is likely to capture some aspects of rents since including the state-industry wage 
effect matters for the results. Overall, there is relatively little evidence that unions have 
an effect on the pay of managers. 
Our results differ from Neumark and Wachter (1995) which is similar in spirit to our 
study although they consider a different time period. Using industry level data, they find 
that higher unionization of workers is associated with lower pay for non-union workers and 
managers, controlling for main industry and year effects. On the other hand, when they 
use city level data, they find the opposite effect on non-union workers. In part, our results 
suggest that either it might be important to control for industry and time interactions, or 
to employ other strategies to capture the level of rents in an industry and its change over 
time. However, without these controls we generally find a positive association between the 
wages of different occupations and the fraction of workers unionized rather than a negative 
one. We feel that this positive association is likely to reflect industry rents. 
In order to probe the influence of unions on other occupations further we also pooled the 
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observations for all occupations in a cell, and regressed the fraction of managers in the cell 
on the fraction of unionized workers. This is the quantity analogue to the pay regressions 
above. Table XIV displays the results. We find consistently significant negative effects 
of both the level of unionization on the fraction of managers in the cell and of the union 
wage differential. If unions are ind d causing these differences, the pattern suggests that 
unions depress both the supply of managers to a cell and the demand. A supply side effect 
might be that there is a compensating differential for managing a unionized firm: it may 
be more difficult or less enjoyable to manage a unionized firm or establishment. A demand 
side effect might be that firms higher fewer managers when unions are present, because 
unions and managers are substitutes. This could be because the higher wages in unionized 
establishments prevent worker shirking at a lower level of supervision. However, it seems 
to be mostly the union wage differential that matters for managers' wages and the fraction 
of workers unionized that matters for quantities, which seems to suggest that such a supply 
and demand driven explanation is unlikely. 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In general, we find a negative cross-sectional association between CEO pay and unioniza-
tion. This is both true across countries and across firms in the U.S. The effects in this 
case are relatively large, CEO pay is roughly 2 percent lower for each 10 point rise in 
unionization rates in U.S. firms. While these results may not be individually significant, 
they all point in the same direction. The one caveat to these results is that we found in the 
Hirsch sample that firms with low unionization rates actually pay their CEOs more than 
those without any unions. We have no check on this result in any of the other samples. 
Since the res ilts are not strongly significant, we are not sure whether we should put too 
much weight on this finding. 
Our second basic finding is that changes in unionization are not associated with changes 
22 
in CEO pay in the opposite direction. Again, we find this both in the international compar-
isons and in the comparisons across firms. In fact, in the Bronars, Deere, and Tracy data 
we find a relatively sizeable positive association between unions and CEO pay. CEO pay 
is roughly 2.5 percent higher for each 10 point rise in unionization rates. A similar result 
is pchoed in the CPS data for other managers. Their pay seems to move in unison with 
the degree of unionization of their industry and region unless we introduce the industry 
wage differential as a control. If the industry wage effect really captures rents, this may 
indicate that the finding in the Bronars, Deere, and Tracy data m a y also reflect the role 
of changing rents over time. 
We also did not find any evidence of a positive effect of unions on CEO pay in the 
unionization election data. Our strongest results there indicate that a loss of union mem-
bers due to decertification elections is possibly associated with higher CEO pay, but the 
results are noisy. Since we regard election outcomes as relatively random changes in union-
ization, this corroborates the findings that any positive association between unionization 
and managerial pay may be due to rents. 
While the various datasets we have analyzed seem to reveal relatively little evidence that 
unions depress the pay for managers, unions may have an impact on managers nevertheless. 
In the CPS we found a very consistent pattern that fewer managers are employed where 
unions are stronger. Thus, unions may redistribute rents towards workers not by lowering 
the pay of managers but by reducing their number and therefore their wage bill. 
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Appendix: States and Industries Used in the CPS 
Analysis 
For the analysis in section 5 we have grouped states and two digit industries into larger 
aggregates based on size and proximity, in order to assure that more of the cells we are 
using actually contain any observations. 
The 16 regional aggregates are: 
1. Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island 
2. Connecticut, New York 
3. New Jersey, Pennsylvania 
4. Michigan, Ohio 
5. Indiana, Illinois 
6. Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa 
7. Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas 
8. Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, DC 
9. West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee 
10. Georgia, Florida 
11. Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana 
12. Oklahoma, Texas 
13. Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, Washington, Oregon 
14. Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Nevada 
15. California 
16. Alaska, Hawaii 
The 26 industry aggregates are (the CPS Detailed Industry Recodes are in parentheses): 
1. Agriculture service, other agriculture, forestry and fisheries (01-02, 46) 
2. Mining (03) 
3. Construction (04) 
4. Lumber, wood, furniture, fixtures, stone, clay, glass, and concrete (05-07) 
5. Primary and fabricated metals, metals industries not specified (08-10) 
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6. Machinery, including electric, professional and photographic equipment, watches (11-
12, 16) 
7. Auto vehicles, aircraft, parts, and other transportation equipment (13-15) 
8. Toys, amusement, and sporting goods, and miscellaneous manufacturing (17-18) 
9. Food, tobacco, and kindred products (19-20) 
10. Textiles, apparel, and leather products (21-22, 28) 
11. Paper, printing, publishing, and allied industries (23-24) 
12. Chemicals, petroleum and coal products, rubber, miscellaneous plastic, and allied 
products (25-27) 
13. Transportation (29) 
14. Communications (30) 
15. Utilities and sanitary services (31) 
16. Wholesale trade (32) 
17. Retail trade (33) 
18. Banking and other finance (34) 
19. Insurance and real estate (35) 
20. Private household and personal services (36, 39) 
21. Business and other professional services (37, 45) 
22. Repair services (38) 
23. Entertainment and recreation services (40) 
24. Hospitals and health services (41-42) 
25. Education services (43) 
26. Social services (44) 
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Cross Country Panel Regressions 
CEOs 
Dependent Variable: 





























































































Data sources: Data on CEO compensation are from Abowd and Bognanno (1995). Unionization rates are from 
Jelle Visser with assistance from Danny Blanchflower and Michael Wallerstein. Data refer to 12 countries and the 
periods 1984, 1988-1992. Number of observations is 81. All regressions also include dummies for the data source. 
Multiple observations for a particular year and country may be available from different sources. Standard errors in 
parentheses are adjusted for this grouping. 
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Table II: 
Cross Country Panel Regressions 
Human Resource Managers 
Dependent Variable: 






























































































Data sources: See Table I. Number of observations is 45. 
Table III: 
Cross Country Panel Regressions 
Relative Compensation: 
Dependent Variable: 










































































Data sources: See Table I. Observations only refer to the years 1984, 1988, and 1992. Number of observations 
is 45 for the CEO results and 33 for the HR manager results. 
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Table IV: 
Firm Level Regressions 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Salary, Bonus and Other CEO Compensation) 






























































































































































































Data sources: Unionization rates are from Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994), CEO pay data are from Kevin 
Murphy, all other variables are from Compustat. Data refer to four year aggregates for 1971-74, 1975-78, and 
1979-82. Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of Observations is 782. 
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Table V: 
Firm Level Regressions 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Salary, Bonus and Other CEO Compensation) 
Bronars, Deere, and Tracy Data 
Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing 
Fraction Union TTC3 = TW9 = 
(.063) (.104) 









































































































































































Data sources: Unionization rates are from Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994), CEO pay data are from Kevin 
Murphy, all other variables are from Compustat. Data refer to four year aggregates for 1971-74, 1975-78, and 
1979-82. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table VI: 
Firm Level Regressions 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Salary, Bonus and Other CEO Compensation) 
Bronars, Deere, and Tracy Data 

























































































































Industry Effects 44 103 No 
Firm Effects No No 327 
Data sources: Unionization rates are from Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994), CEO pay data are from Kevin 
Murphy, all other variables are from Compustat. Data refer to four year aggregates for 1971-74, 1975-78, and 
1979-82. Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of Observations is 782. 
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Table VII: 
Firm Level Regressions 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln(Salary, Bonus and Other CEO Compensation) 
Hirsch Data 
Full Sample Firms With Anv Union 



















ln(Capital per Worker) 
Tobin's Q 
Investment/Sales 
































































































































































































Data sources: Unionization rates are from Hirsch (1991), CEO pay data are from Kevin Murphy, all other 
variables are from Compustat. All variables except unionization rates are aggregates for the four years 1975-1978. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Unionization rates refer to 1977. 
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Table VIII: 
Firm Level Regressions 
Dependent Variable: 


















































































Data sources: Unionization rates are from Hirsch (1991), CEO pay data are from Kevin Murphy, all other 
variables are from Compustat. All variables except unionization rates are aggregates for the four years 1975-1978. 
Unionization rates refer to 1977. Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations is 227. 
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Table IX: 
Regressions for Union Election Data 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in Ln(Salary, Bonus and Other CEO Compensation) 
Union Gains Members 








Change in ln(Capital 
per Worker) 
Change in Tobin's Q 












































































Sources: Election outcomes are from the NLRB Election Files. CEO pay data are from Kevin Murphy, all 
other data are from Compustat. Dependent variable is the change in CEO pay from the year before the election 
to the year after. Independent variables refer to the year of the election; growth rates refer to the change from the 
year before to the year after the election. Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations is 284. 
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Table X: 
Regressions for Union Election Data 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in Ln(Salary, Bonus and Other CEO Compensation) 
Sample Restricted to Elections Without CEO Turnover 
Union Gains Members 
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per Worker) 
Change in Tobin's Q 





































































Sources: See Table DC. Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations is 220. 
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Table XI: 
Industry/State Level Data from the CPS 
Weighted Cell Means 
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Data source: Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from 1983 and 1993. 




Regressions on Industry/State/Year Level Data from the CPS 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Hourly Wage Coefficient) 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Managers 
Fraction of Workers Unionized 
Union Wage Differential 















Management Related Occupations 
Fraction of Workers Unionized -.043 .084 .084 
(.030) (.030) (.030) 
Union Wage Differential — — — 













Fraction of Workers Unionized .112 .010 -.012 
(.027) (.023) (.023) 
Union Wage Differential — — — 











Fraction of Workers Unionized .173 .183 — 
(.019) (.013) 





























Fraction of Workers Unionized 














Data source: Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from 1983 and 1993. The num-
ber of observations ranges from 4,123 for management related occupations to 4,502 for non-union workers. The 
dependent variable is the state/industry/year coefficient of a regression of the In hourly wage on years of school-
ing, potential experience and its square, dummies for female, black, in an SMSA, and part-time, and a full set of 
state/ industry/year interactions. The first-stage regression is run separately for each occupation. The union wage 
differential is obtained from a similar regression for union and non-union workers which also included a full set 
of state/industry/year/union interactions. It is obtained by subtracting the union coefficient from the non-union 




Regressions on Industry/State/Year Level Data from the CPS 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Hourly Wage Coefficient) 
Independent Variable 
Fraction of Workers Unionized 
Union Wrage Differential 
Fraction Managers Unionized 














































Management Related Occupations 
Fraction of Workers Unionized 
Union Wage Differential 
Fraction in the Occupation 
Unionized 











































Fraction of Workers Unionized 
Union Wage Differential 
Fraction Professionals Unionized 








































Fraction of Workers Unionized 
Industry Wage Differential 
























Data source: Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from 1983 and 1993. The num-
ber of observations ranges from 4,123 for management related occupations to 4,502 for non-union workers. The 
dependent variable is the state/industry/year coefficient of a regression of the In hourly wage on years of school-
ing, potential experience and its square, dummies for female, black, in an SMSA, and part-time, and a full set of 
state/industry/year interactions. The first-stage regression is run separately for each occupation. The union wage 
differential is obtained from a similar regression for union and non-union workers which also included a full set 
of state/industry/year/union interactions. It is obtained by subtracting the union coefficient from the non-union 
coefficient for the cell. The industry (state/year) wage differential is the the set of coefficients for non-union workers 




Regressions on Industry/State/Year Level Data from the CPS 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: Fraction Managers 
Fraction of Workers Unionized -.082 -.035 -.074 -.033 -.095 -.038 -.088 -.036 
(.006) (.004) (.006) (.004) (.006) (.004) (.006) (.004) 
Union Wage Differential — — -.038 -.011 — — -.024 -.009 
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.003) 
Industry Wage Differential — — — — .007 .018 .068 .013 
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.006) 
Dependent Variable: Fraction Managers and Related Occupations 
Fraction of Workers Unionized Tl28 ^043 TTTl TfHI Tl63 T051 Tl52 T049~ 
(.010) (.005) (.010) (.005) (.009) (.005) (.009) (.005) 
Union Wage Differential — — 
Industry Wage Differential — — 
Industry, State, Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry*Year Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Data source: Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from 1983 and 1993. The number 
of observations is 4,502. The dependent variable is the fraction of managers or managers and related occupations 
in a state/industry/year cell. The union wage differential is obtained from a similar regression for union and non-
union workers which also included a full set of state/industry/year/union interactions. It is obtained by subtracting 
the union coefficient from the non-union coefficient for the cell. The industry (state/year) wage differential is the 
the set of coefficients for non-union workers from the same regression. Regressions are weighted by the number of 
observations in the cells. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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